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The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a period of signifi cant geopolitical changes that gave way to the emergence of ensuing ‘crises’, i.e., “a situation in which the traditional equilibrium 
of a system undergoes radical changes resulting from the involvement of new 
factors”.1 This was a worldwide phenomenon occurred due to the collapse of the 
erstwhile Soviet Union that brought to an end of the Cold War era. The effect of 
the ‘crises’, both in positive as well as negative terms, generated corresponding 
changes in expectations and attitudes toward international relations. There is a 
truth lies in it as the world’s geopolitical power structures went through a drastic 
change so much so that the following revealing facts came in to fore: Firstly, the 
Soviet collapse offered the space for the survival of only one superpower-the 
United States; secondly, although turmoil and confl icts continued in the post-
Soviet period, these were limited to their scope and geostrategic implications; 
and thirdly, more open borders allowed the process of globalization and 
regionalization to create a new geo-economic environment, with both positive 
and negative consequences.2 Russia and Mongolia, which have had a long history 
of relations, too found themselves under the infl uence of the post-Cold War new 
realities and began to feel the effects of globalization and regionalization. The 
emergence of new realities was dominated by regional security concerns, both 
economic and strategic, which saw a number of countries getting involved in 
the growing regionalization process. Huntington, however, views it differently 
while commenting that in the post-Cold War era culture and identity rather than 
economic and/or security concerns are the guiding factors behind the growing 
regionalization.3 Whatever may be the guiding factors it has been seen that 
economics played a signifi cant role in driving the regional power relations, and 
hence economic cooperation within a region has resulted in the enhancement of 
confi dence building among the regional actors.
The growing regionalization process in Asia saw Northeast Asia becoming a 
region of vital importance to all the stakeholders including Russia and Mongolia 
whose enduring interests in the region turn out to be one of their key foreign 
policy priorities, particularly since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. But 
the seeds of such Russian and Mongolian interests were sown much earlier when 
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Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled the new Soviet Asian policy during his seminal 
Vladivostok speech on July 28, 1986.4 However, it can be argued if Gorbachev’s 
rethinking of Russia’s role in the Asia-Pacifi c in general and Northeast Asia in 
particular, as epitomized by his 1986 Vladivostok initiative, was indeed the catalyst 
for Mongolia’s seeking a more active role in Northeast Asia.5 Nevertheless, the 
two countries’ interests in the Northeast Asian region have contributed much to 
strengthen their bilateral relations which had suffered a lot in the initial years of 
the post-Soviet period. As Batbayar describes, the post-Soviet trends in overall 
relations between the two countries went through three stages i.e., breakdown, 
stagnation and revival.6 And, it was precisely the beginning of Putin era that 
marked the revival of their relations as both the political-strategic as well as trade 
and economic interests enthused Russia to reemerge in Mongolia. On the other 
hand, revival of Russia-Mongolia relations also owes much to the efforts for 
regional cooperation in Northeast Asia which has its own signifi cance. Although 
the entire region of Northeast Asia includes China (North East region), Japan, 
the two Koreas- South and North, Mongolia and Russia (Far East region), it is 
the only region or more precisely sub-region having no organisational structure 
of its own. Yet, the region holds great potential for bilateral and multilateral 
engagements. 
This article, therefore, seeks to explore the Mongolia factor in Russian policy 
towards Northeast Asia. In the process, it deals with the key elements responsible 
for the evolution of Russian policy towards Northeast Asia which provides 
Mongolia a new regional identity in the post-Soviet period. The importance of 
the region in Russia’s bilateral and multilateral engagements with other regional 
actors for ensuring economic and security gains has also been examined. Besides, 
it also fl icks through the kind of collaboration Russia needs from Mongolia to 
make its presence felt in Northeast Asia.
Evolution of Russian Policy towards Northeast Asia
Ever since the former Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation 
emerged there have been several policy changes in Moscow both at the domestic 
as well as external fronts. At the external front, Northeast Asia fi gured prominently 
in Russia’s foreign policy and hence emerged as one of the priority areas to be 
engaged in, particularly since Putin came to power. Not only the geographic 
location with its strategic signifi cance but also economic importance of the 
Northeast Asian region brought signifi cant changes in Russian policy planning 
which gave weightage to the region in terms of viable economic cooperation. 
However, Russian policy towards Northeast Asia, as Leszek Buszynski describes, 
can be understood in terms of a three-level policy, i.e., global, regional and 
bilateral.7 According to him, at the global level the Russian leadership intended 
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to maintain “diplomatic balance” within the region against the Western world, 
particularly against the U.S.; at the regional level Russia sought economic and 
security integration into the Asia-Pacifi c region both to improve its economy and 
to ensure stability along its Eastern borders; and at the bilateral level Russian 
concern was to have specifi c gains in dealings with individual Northeast Asian 
countries for security, economic and trade benefi ts.8 As such Russian policy in the 
Northeast Asian region evolved with specifi c objectives giving due consideration 
to some key factors as underlined below:
Regional Integration through Economic Cooperation
One of the key factors that infl uenced the evolution of Russian policy towards 
Northeast Asia has been to achieve the objective of greater economic integration 
into world economy through regional economic cooperation.9 This intended to 
have increased interaction, trade and investment with neighbouring Northeast 
Asian countries of China, Japan, the two Koreas and Mongolia, so that the Pacifi c 
Russia i.e., the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia could be able to fi nd new 
opportunities for their economic advancement and integration. As Shkuropat 
describes, the central idea was to look beyond “the system of security” to get 
involved into “a system of economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.” What Russia, 
on its part, did was that it initiated (a) the opening of the hitherto closed city of 
Vladivostok, (b) paying fresh attention to neighbouring economies, (c) permitting 
for freer movement for the factors of production, and (d) raising expectations that 
products from the Russian Far East could fi nd new markets abroad. 10
Multilateralism in Russian Diplomacy 
The strategies behind Russian efforts to evolve its policy towards Northeast 
Asia were developed within the framework of post-Soviet Russian diplomacy, 
which was based on pragmatism taking into consideration the national interests 
in the changed national and international environment. These new strategies were 
refl ected in three new major policy documents released by the Russian government 
in the fi rst half of 2000: National Security Concept (January), Military Doctrine 
(April) and the new Foreign Policy Concept (June). In these documents, Russian 
leadership declared its major goal as seeking the establishment and reestablishment 
of Russia’s relations with non-Western countries, particularly the Northeast Asian 
nations.11 An important element in the new diplomacy was the orientation towards 
multilateralism that could address fundamental issues and problems concerning 
national interests. The emphasis was placed on not only securing membership but 
also participating actively in international organizations and other multilateral 
forums including international economic institutions and regional organizations. 
Priority was accorded on the development of stronger, mutually benefi cial 
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bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation with key countries in the Northeast 
Asian region, such as China, Japan, the two Koreas and Mongolia with both the 
strategic and economic objectives.12 
Energy Factor in Russian Diplomacy
Energy sector has been one area which contributed much to motivate Russia 
in evolving its policy towards Northeast Asia. It was more so because Russia 
has the potential to exploit its energy resources, mainly oil and natural gas, both 
for its economic development as well as helping the country for its strategic 
positioning in the Northeast Asian region and beyond. The increasing demand for 
energy in Northeast Asia, triggered especially by China, created new opportunity 
for Russia to exploit new energy markets by making most of potentially huge, yet 
still underdeveloped oil and natural gas resources lying in the eastern region.13 As 
such Russia got interested in diversifying its energy exports as well as opening 
a great energy “window” to East Asia that could create additional elements for 
energy stability in the whole Asia-Pacifi c.14 In this regard, it needs to mention 
here that the Russian government unveiled very ambitious energy export goals in 
a document entitled Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, which 
was released in 2010. According to the document, the target was set to increase 
exports in oil in the Asia-Pacifi c region from 8 per cent to 22-25 per cent and 
natural gas from 0 per cent to 20 per cent by 2030.15 “Energy diplomacy”, thus 
occupies a key position in the Russian foreign policy in general and Northeast 
Asian policy in particular. For, as Tsuneo Akaha suggests, “energy has become 
one of the essential parts of Russia’s identity in the world.”16 
Russia’s Re-engagements with Northeast Asia
The beginning of Putin era was the landmark event for Russia’s re-engagements 
with Northeast Asia. In fact, Vladimir Putin’s coming to power as a new President 
in early 2000 following the election of a new Duma (Russian Parliament) towards 
the end of 1998 witnessed Russia heading towards a positive note both internally 
and externally. This was the commencement of a period of greater internal political 
stability with a relatively stronger economy which “permitted the development 
and pursuit of a more integrated set of national policies, including a long-term 
strategic development plan and the development of a supportive foreign policy.”17 
Hence, the year 2000 marked the beginning of Russia’s new engagement with 
Northeast Asia by pursuing new forms of mutually benefi cial cooperation with 
individual countries in the region.
At the outset, Russia’s most signifi cant political partner in Northeast Asia has 
been China in the sense that both Moscow and Beijing have common interest in 
opposing the US interests in the region. Ever since Putin visited Beijing in 2000 
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and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin paid a return visit to Moscow in 2001, 
the two sides have signed a wide-ranging treaty of friendship and cooperation in 
diverse areas besides resolving their long-standing border disputes. Under Putin’s 
leadership prospects for growing trade and economic relations between Russia 
and China became high with projects undertaken on joint energy, fuel processing, 
transportation, manufacturing and innovative technology. However, a number of 
bilateral issues also seem to have impeded the robust political ties between the 
two countries. For example, though the prospect of pipelines to transport Siberian 
oil and gas to Northeast China has been advanced, Moscow’s “ambiguous 
position” on such supplies “has frustrated China’s aggressive energy import 
policy, confounding the Sino-Japanese competition for the energy resources in 
Siberia and the Russian Far East.”18 But over the years not only the two sides 
have made notable progress in forging multilateral cooperation through regional 
international forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the 
BRICS, and the U.N. Security Council but also their bilateral trade is fl ourishing, 
boosted by the opening of a key oil pipeline.19 
Next comes Japan with which Russia has been pursuing cordial relations 
despite a long-running dispute over rightful ownership of the Southern Kuriles 
that comprised of four sparsely populated islands in the Pacifi c known as 
Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup and the Habomai Rocks. Although the 1998 Moscow 
Declaration on building a long-term creative partnership provided a fresh scope 
for cooperation between Russia and Japan,20 it was indeed after Putin’s visit 
to Japan in September 2000 that saw the two sides getting along bilaterally on 
cooperation in international and regional affairs including Japanese support for 
Russia’s entry into WTO. Today Moscow considers Japan as a source of capital 
and a development partner for the country’s Far Eastern energy resources, while 
Tokyo looks at Russia as an alternative source of energy.  Following the March 
2011 nuclear reactor meltdown in Fukushima, Japan fi nds mutual benefi ts in 
pursuing closer economic ties with Russia, especially in diversifying latter’s 
energy supplies. Evidently, Japan has shown keen interest in cooperating with 
Russia in building a liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) plant in Vladivostok, which may 
further diversify sources of LNG supplies to Japan and reduce its existing heavy 
reliance on Asian and Oceanic sources.21 
As regards Russian initiatives towards the two Koreas, it has been revealed 
that after a decade of not-so-friendly relations, the year 2000 turned out to be a 
positive sign in the development of Russia-North Korea relations. It was in this 
year that Putin’s unprecedented visit to North Korea proved to be a historic one 
as it marked the fi rst visit by a Russian President since the 1950s, which was 
followed by the equally historic return visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il 
to Russia in 2001. During this visit the two sides signed the Moscow Declaration, 
“in which they declared their intention to support global stability” besides 
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agreeing “to grant fi rst priority to projects for the reconstruction of enterprises 
built by joint efforts”.22 The same year saw Putin’s visit to South Korea in order to 
further reinforce their bilateral relationship with an already important economic 
partner, especially for the Russian Far East. These events refl ected key features 
of Russia’s new diplomacy of engaging the two Koreas not only to reduce tension 
and cultivate peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula but also to promote 
trade and economic cooperation. 
Yet another visit of Putin in 2000 was his Mongolia visit aimed at re-engaging 
Russia with Mongolia, which had, by then, become overwhelmed by Chinese 
investment. But, before discussing Russia’s relations with Mongolia in the post-
2000 period it is crucial to understand Mongolia in the regional setting so as to 
understand the Mongolian factor in the overall Russian policy towards Northeast 
Asia. 
Mongolia in Regional Setting
Even though in terms of regional setting Mongolia is placed in the Northeast 
Asian region, the quest for this new regional identity began only in the early 
1990s when this tiny populated country began enjoying the fruits of “real 
independence” after remaining under Soviet protection for almost seven 
decades.23 More precisely, it is worth mentioning that during the Cold War period, 
Mongolia belonged to the Soviet-led security system that provided important 
security assurances, including military ones, to its client states like Mongolia, and 
so its identity was perceived as that of a Soviet bloc country. The Soviet collapse, 
however, pushed Mongolia into a security dilemma so much so that search for 
regional identity began and Central Asia was identifi ed as the region to which 
Mongolia belonged geographically, historically, and culturally.24 Nevertheless, 
it was Northeast Asia that fi nally emerged as the apparent choice for Mongolia’s 
new regional identity. The new regional identity of Mongolia as a Northeast 
Asian country was not a sudden occurrence. It came as a result of the debate 
among several Mongolian elites, intellectuals and policy makers who argued that 
Mongolia would have great advantages in future if it preferred to align with the 
Northeast Asian countries, thus having a Northeast Asian regional identity. They 
defended their arguments by a number of reasons that include, among others, the 
following:25 
(i) The Asia-Pacifi c, of which Northeast Asia is a vital part, was perceived 
to be emerging as an extraordinarily important region in the twenty-fi rst 
century;  
(ii) Mongolia would come strategically under the economic “umbrella” of 
technologically advanced countries like China, Japan, South Korea, and 
the United States; 
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(iii) Mongolia will have comparatively better relations with the Russian Far 
East and China’s North East; 
(iv) Mongolia’s eastern part, which is the repository of country’s mineral 
resources can be made readily accessible to the rest of Northeast Asia by 
road and railways, thus giving Mongolia another access to the sea perhaps 
through Tumen river; and 
(v) Mongolia will get an opportunity to serve as a land bridge between 
Northeast Asia and Europe. 
Nevertheless, Mongolia’s national security concerns remained the main reason 
for the necessity to secure its new regional identity and establish close links with 
Northeast Asia because it would provide the needed bulwark to ensure Mongolia’s 
political, economic and strategic security.26 In fact, it was Mongolia’s National 
Security and Foreign Policy Concepts adopted on June 30, 1994 that Mongolia’s 
new international strategy was incorporated.27 These two documents, approved 
by the State Great Hural (Mongolian Parliament), put emphasis on pursuing 
a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant geographic neighbours-
Russia and China, underlined the importance of economic security in protecting 
Mongolia’s national integrity, and warned against too much dependence on 
any one country for trade. In other words, these two documents articulated the 
“Third Neighbour” policy of Mongolia.28 However, at that time after no single 
nation came forward to shoulder the mantle of “Third Neighbour,” “Mongolian 
thinking turned to advocating a new relationship with Northeast Asia that went 
beyond economic ties to include political considerations.”29 Within the political 
and intellectual circles, alignment with Northeast Asia was recognized as “the 
key to Mongolia’s economic growth, national security, and integration into the 
global economy.”30 This is more so because Northeast Asia has been considered 
as Mongolia’s natural economic territory, and in a more specifi c term, as coined 
by Robert Scalapino, a “regional Third Neighbour.”31  The whole idea of having a 
Northeast Asian regional identity, thus, points to safeguarding Mongolia’s overall 
security in the emerging geo-economic and geostrategic scenario. 
Of late, Mongolia has been playing, what Alicia Campi describes, its own 
“Great Game” in Northeast Asia by changing the rules for the development 
of its minerals and energy security.32 The most recent changes took place on 
1 July 2014, when Mongolian parliament approved changes to the country’s 
2006 Minerals Law in order to attract new foreign investments.33 All this has 
been taking place because Mongolia realizes that “Northeast Asia’s economic 
growth requires secure energy resources and sees its own mineral deposits … as 
motivation for regional actors to implement an ‘infrastructure linkage strategy’ 
for Mongolia to build up its poor rail and pipeline infrastructure”.34 At the same 
time, Mongolian policymakers considers Northeast Asia as home to four of the 
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world’s major powers- the United States, Russia, China, and Japan,35 and hence 
having a Northeast Asian identity gives Mongolia extra mileage to intermingle 
with these powers.
Russia and Mongolia: Implications for Northeast Asia
Commenting on the “Rise of Mongolia” Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay has 
described Mongolia as a country which is “emerging at a speed that is unrivalled 
around the world”.36 It registered a whopping 17.3 per cent growth rate in 2011 
and has since been continuing with a double-digit growth rate despite fl uctuating 
fi gures. Interestingly, it has been projected to be the second top-performing 
economy in 2014, only after South Sudan which has currently about 15 per cent 
growth rate.37 With the expected launch of new large-scale mining projects, GDP 
is likely to be doubled by 2015.38 Such an extraordinary growth rate has been 
realized due to a booming mining sector consisting of vast resources of coal, 
copper, rare earth minerals, uranium, gold and silver apart from an enormous 
intake of foreign investment including Russia. Thanks to the mining boom, 
Mongolia is now being counted among the fastest growing economy in the world 
having a mineral wealth of US $1.3 trillion.39 Alicia Campi rightly describes 
Mongolia as having “the potential to strongly infl uence the political, economic, 
and environmental atmosphere of its Northeast Asian region”.40
Since Russian policy towards Northeast Asia began taking a defi nite shape at 
the turn of the twenty fi rst century, Mongolia too occupied a place of importance 
in Russia’s foreign policy. Encouraging signs emerged when both Russia and 
Mongolia realized that good neighbourly cooperation between them was necessary 
to keep away the Chinese from exercising any dominant role in Mongolia. The 
revival of relationship between the two sides began when Russian President 
Vladimir Putin visited Mongolia on November 13-14, 2000, the fi rst since 
1974 visit of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. Putin’s visit culminated with 
signing of a 25-point memorandum of cooperation, named as the “Ulaanbaatar 
Declaration”, which laid a legal groundwork for the restoration of bilateral ties 
between the two countries. The declaration set forth “the willingness of Moscow 
and Ulaanbaatar to closely coordinate their policy in international affairs on a 
wide range of issues.”41 Due to the steady development Russia-Mongolia bilateral 
ties have now entered into a new period of growth. The frequent exchange of 
high-level visits between the two nations has deepened their mutual trust even 
in the bilateral economic relations, though they have failed to reach the level of 
Mongolia-China economic relations.
In an apparent attempt to give bilateral ties a much-needed boost, in 2003, 
the Russian government wrote off 98 per cent of this debt, once valued at US 
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dollar 11 billion. However, the move appeared to have a little help to encourage 
bilateral trade and investment ties. It was hydrocarbon the supplies of which 
from Russia then became a key factor in reviving economic relations of the two 
countries. In terms of trade cooperation, particularly since the year 2000 the 
negative downward trend of the early and mid-1990s has been diminishing so 
much so that the volume of trade between the two sides further grew to reach at 
US dollar 1.6 billion in the January-May period of 2009, attaining ahead of time 
the one billion-dollar objective for the year 2010.42  In 2010, both Russia and 
Mongolia signed a medium-term programme for developing trade and economic 
ties for the period 2011-2015, and ratifi ed a plan also for improving the terms of 
their regional and cross-border cooperation. This resulted in an increase in their 
bilateral trade which in 2010 valued at US dollar 1.1 billion, while in 2011, 2012 
and 2013 it has been worth more than US dollar 1.6 billion. But this fi gure is 
much less than Mongolia’s total trade with China which is valued at US dollar 6 
billion. Even Mongolian exports to Russia remains just at US dollar 70 million, 
thus representing merely 1.4 percent of the country’s total global exports. In 
order to overcome the large gap in bilateral trade turnover which favours Russia, 
Mongolia has proposed to increase bilateral trade to the tune of US dollar 10 
billion by 2020 besides exempting Mongolian goods from Russian customs 
duties and quotas for 20 years.43 The proposal was made during Putin’s latest visit 
to Mongolia on 3 September 2014, though the Russian President did not promise 
much except “lifting some restrictions on Mongolian meat exports, while seeking 
to increase exports of Russian vehicles and the expansion of Rosneft gas stations 
in the Mongolian market”.44
Further collaboration can be seen through Russian investments in Mongolia 
especially in joint ventures, Mongolia’s reliance on Russian energy supply 
especially oil and Russian participation in Mongolian mining sector mainly 
in uranium and in projects such as Tavan-Tolgoi etc. Mongolian-Russian 
joint ventures built in early years have all along been the backbone fi rms in 
Mongolia, and the newly-formed railway venture and Mongolia-Russia uranium 
production joint venture (both in 2009) have created conditions for Russia’s 
future involvement in tapping mine resources and going in for infrastructure 
development in Mongolia. The petroleum products Mongolia badly needs have 
all been practically imported from Russia. In fact, Russia provides Mongolia 
with “95 percent of its oil imports-with the leverage this implies-and the totality 
of its grain imports.”45 Mongolia is also heavily dependent on Russian electric 
power, leaving it susceptible to price variations. Notably, Russia still has a 49 per 
cent stake in Mongolia’s major copper producer, Erdenet and Mongoltsvetmet 
joint ventures. There are more than 250 smaller joint ventures in Mongolia, with 
combined Russian investments totaling over US dollar 20 million. 
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Presently, Russian interest to invest in Mongolia has become unprecedented 
due to the fact that unlike the Soviet period when it was a state investment, now 
it is mainly the interest of Russian businesses with the backing from the Russian 
Government.  While the Russians see their activities in Mongolia serving as a 
buffer against a rising China, Mongolians consider it as their geostrategic needs of 
balancing its relations with the two immediate neighbours. Yet, Russian motives 
in Mongolia can be identifi ed as follows:
(i) Russia seeks to reassert its infl uence in Mongolia to limit Chinese 
monopolization of Mongolian trade; 
(ii) It wants to help exploit Mongolian uranium resources for the benefi t to 
Mongolia;
(iii) It needs Mongolia’s cheap coal for its Siberian and Far East industrialization 
plans as coal resources in these regions are  expensive; 
(iv) It delivers more than 90 per cent of diesel and petroleum products as well 
as electric power to support Mongolia to strengthen its economy; and 
(v) It treats Mongolia as part of Russia’s sphere of infl uence serving as a 
buffer to growing Chinese penetration north towards East Siberia. 
On the other hand, being a Northeast Asian country Mongolia wants Japan 
and the two Koreas to partner with Russia in building pipelines and expanding 
rail routes north to the Pacifi c to enable Mongolia to fi nd new trade partners. 
Strikingly, today not only Mongolia but also North Korea provides opportunities 
for Russia to raise its stakes in Northeast Asian matters. It is to be noted that 
despite the Soviet collapse and relative negligence on the part of Moscow in the 
1990s, Ulaanbaatar and Pyongyang never abandoned their attempts to renew ties 
with Russia. Explaining the reasons for Mongolia and North Korea teaming up 
with Russia, Jargalsaikhan Mendee highlights the following facts:46 
(i) Mongolia, North Korea and Russia, all of them, fear Chinese demographic 
expansion in their countries;
(ii) Mongolia, North Korea and the Russian Far East are considered to be 
the most marginalized and underdeveloped parts of Northeast Asia, while 
China, Japan, and South Korea are seen as economic powerhouses;  
(iii) Although Mongolia and North Korea have the largest mineral deposits, 
both lack fuel and natural gas and, therefore, they seek benefi ts from the 
long debated gas pipelines from Siberia to China and South Korea; 
(iv) Russia is the only way for Mongolia and North Korea to reach Eurasian 
markets and to import fuel and technology; 
(v) Russia’s partnership with North Korea enhances its ability to deal with 
South Korea and Japan on economic issues and with the U.S. on security 
issues; 
(vi) Mongolia heightens Russia’s stake in Sino-Russian relations and offers 
leverage for Moscow when dealing with Beijing; 
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(vii) For Mongolia and North Korea, Russia has been the only source of 
political, economic and military support in the face of an assertive 
China; and
(viii) Unlike Central and East European former communist states, Mongolia 
and North Korea have positive views of their past ties with Russia, 
despite setbacks.  
Lately, Mongolia has been seen developing effective bilateral economic 
relations with all countries in Northeast Asia. Since 80 per cent of foreign 
investment and foreign trade comes from four regional countries - Russia, China, 
Japan, and South Korea, they have much infl uence in Mongolia’s economy.47 
For quite sometimes now, Mongolia has also been making efforts in creating a 
Northeast Asian regional energy cooperation mechanism under the auspices of 
ESCAP. The mechanism, which would ensure safe and secure energy supply for 
Northeast Asian countries through exchange of information and experience, may 
further open ways for developing unifi ed regional energy policy.48 
Conclusion
Russia’s redefi nition of national interests and foreign policy priorities has 
led to a new strategic engagement in the Northeast Asian region with a strong 
emphasis on constructive participation and multilateral approaches.49 In this 
regard, it may be recalled that the theme of the 2012 APEC summit held in 
Vladivostok, “Integrate to Grow, Innovate to Prosper,” itself speaks of Russia’s 
desire to encourage regional integration and foster an innovative economy not only 
in its eastern regions but also in the whole Asia-Pacifi c. Since Northeast Asian 
nations are getting involved in the regional integration processes with different 
intensity, Russia has an opportunity to fi nd its own “niche” in the region. That is 
where the Mongolia factor holds greater signifi cance, especially in positioning 
Russia within the Northeast Asian region. Since neither Russia nor Mongolia 
could ever think of avoiding each other, their growing partnership will serve as a 
catalyst in pursuing Moscow’s national interests of developing Russian Far East 
and Eastern Siberia in which Northeast Asia is likely to play an important role. 
Certainly, Russia remains the most approachable and understandable partner for 
Mongolian people and political elites so much so that Mongolia accompanied by 
North Korea may serve as Russia’s economic gateways to Northeast Asia and 
a strategic buffer from its traditional competitors. At the moment, Mongolia is 
at the centre of the planet’s greatest resource boom as the coal extraction and 
other mega-mines are expected to triple the national economy by 2020.50 That 
is why this small but remarkable nation in the Northeast Asian region is being 
called as “Minegolia”. Whatever appellation it may have, it is on the brink 
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of one of the most dramatic transformations in the human history in terms of 
economic viability, and Russia will not let this opportunity go waste, not only 
for its bilateral relations with Mongolia but also for its economic relationships 
within the framework of multilateralism with countries belonging to Northeast 
Asia. However, it remains to be seen if Russia will be able to pursue its current 
regional strategy of transforming the nature of economic relations in Northeast 
Asia.
Contributor: Dr. Sharad K Soni, Assistant Professor of Mongolian and 
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